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Abstract
Background: Access to HIV diagnosis is life-saving; however the use of rapid diagnostic tests in combination is vulnerable to
wrongly diagnosing HIV infection when both screening tests give a false positive result. Misclassification of HIV patients can
also occur due to poor quality control, administrative errors and lack of supervision and training of staff. Me´decins Sans
Frontie`res discovered in 2004 that HIV negative individuals were enrolled in some HIV programmes. This paper describes
the result of an audit of three sites to review testing practices, implement improved testing algorithms and offer re-testing
to clients enrolled in the HIV clinic.
Findings: In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi and Ethiopia patients were identified for HIV retesting. In
total, 44 false-positive patients were identified in HIV programmes in DRC, two in Burundi and seven in Ethiopia. Some of
those identified had been abandoned by partners or started on anti-retroviral therapy or prophylaxis. Despite potential
damage to programme reputations, no impact in terms of testing uptake occurred with mean monthly testing volumes
stable after introduction of re-testing. In order to prevent the problem, training, supervision and quality control of testing
procedures were strengthened. A simple and feasible confirmation test was added to the test algorithm. Prevalence of false
positives after introducing the changes varied from zero percent (95% CI 0%–8.2%) to 10.3 percent (95% CI: 7.2%–14.1%) in
Burundi and DRC respectively.
Conclusion: False HIV diagnoses were found in a variety of programme settings and had devastating individual
consequences. We re-tested individuals in our programmes while instituting improved testing procedures without
a negative impact on test uptake. Considering the importance of correct diagnosis to the individual, as well as the resources
needed to care for someone with HIV, it is critical to ensure that all patients registered in HIV programmes are accurately
diagnosed.
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Introduction
Access to HIV diagnosis is life-saving and essential to
confronting the HIV pandemic. The WHO algorithm which uses
rapid diagnostic tests (RDT) in combination to diagnose HIV has
been critical to scaling up access to life-saving treatment [1].
However the algorithm is vulnerable to wrongly diagnosing HIV
infection when both screening tests give a false positive result. This
has been documented in a number of countries and is pre-
dominantly caused by serological cross reactivity [2–6]. Cross
reactivity, whereby an antibody will bind to an antigen that differs
from its originator antigen, is common and linked to a variety of
different phenomena such as immature immune responses, other
infections, or autoimmune disorders [7,8]. Cross reactivity is often
signalled by a high rate of discordant results as the cross reacting
antibodies are known to react to the test antigens variably [9,10].
The use of the tie-breaker algorithm, where a third RDT is used to
resolve a discordant result, increases the risk of misdiagnosis in
these circumstances as it will react unpredictably with the cross-
reactive antibodies and therefore the outcome is determined by
chance [11]. False positive results are higher in low HIV
prevalence contexts as even RDTs with a high specificity can
perform poorly. Other reasons for misclassifying individuals with
HIV are linked to administrative errors, test storage and transport
conditions, poor quality control, and lack of training and
supervision of staff.
Me´decins Sans Frontie`res-Operational Centre Amsterdam
(MSF) offers free of charge comprehensive HIV care programmes
in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia in both rural and urban settings
often in partnership with local Ministries of Health. The problem
of misclassification of HIV diagnosis became apparent to MSF
staff when falsely diagnosed HIV individuals were identified in
programmes in 2004. The experience led us to address quality
control procedures, and improve the diagnostic algorithm. This
paper uses three country case studies to illustrate how the problem
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was identified, characterise the profile of individuals falsely
identified as HIV positive, describe the programmatic response
and illustrate the consequences of the misclassification on
individuals affected.
Methods
An audit of HIV testing in MSF-OCA programmes was done
during the period 2004–5 to investigate reasons for false positive
HIV tests. This review resulted in the implementation of new
policies and procedures which included re-testing high risk
individuals to confirm their HIV status. The results of both the
audit and the implementation of the new procedures are described
here using three country case studies from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi and Ethiopia.
The programmes were chosen from amongst 22 programmes in
Sub-Saharan Africa that were active during this period. DRC,
Burundi and Ethiopia were chosen because they are representative
of the overall programmes in MSF during this time period and
because data on the individuals re-tested was available.
Programmatic intervention
(i) Quality control. In 2003 and 2004, MSF started to
receive reports of HIV negative individuals being discovered in
MSF’s HIV programmes. One of MSF’s earliest HIV programmes
in Zambia was the first to signal the problem followed by
programmes in Humera, Ethiopia and Bukavu, DRC. MSF’s
response to these reports was to review testing procedures and
quality control. Test kit expiry dates were double checked.
Records of transport and storage conditions of test kits were
reviewed. Training and supervision of testing centres was in-
tensified to minimise errors in the performance and interpretation
of tests or in the handling or labelling of samples. All positive and
discordant results at the VCT sites were repeated on venous
samples in the laboratory. Quality control for each new box of
HIV tests was introduced using known positive and negative
controls. The standard procedure of monthly quality control of 20
randomly selected positive and negative samples was reinforced.
(ii) Confirmation testing. In 2005, when it became
apparent that false positives were still present despite these
measures, the decision was made to introduce confirmation
testing. The choice of confirmation test was Western Blot where
possible or Orgenics Immunocomb CombfirmHHIV confirmation
test (OIC). The use of the latter test is described elsewhere [6]. It
has proved feasible for use in peripheral laboratories, takes just two
hours to perform and costs five euro. A limitation is that
serological confirmation tests are prone to indeterminate results
in early seroconversion or severe immunosuppression. A testing
algorithm was designed to address these limits (Figure 1).
Clients were told that the screening RDTs indicated the result
was positive, but that a confirmatory test was required. Where
testing was done from a capillary sample by the counsellor in front
of the client, a venous sample was drawn to re-test all discordant
and positive results in the laboratory. Most programmes continued
to immediately refer those screening positive to the HIV clinic to
avoid defaulting. The result of the confirmation test was conveyed
to their clinician to be communicated at the next visit. More
rarely, where there was a high prevalence of false positives,
confirmation testing was done while the client waits. In these
settings, information regarding the risk of false positive results was
included in pre-test counselling.
(iii) Repeat testing on new clients. Finally, treatment
programmes that admitted patients who had been tested
elsewhere, repeated the HIV test on a new sample in order to
confirm the result prior to enrolling an individual for care.
(iv) Re-testing patients already registered in HIV
programmes. Patients registered in HIV clinics prior to
introduction of the new protocols were advised of the changed
procedures. They were told that very occasionally RDTs falsely
identify other antibodies as HIV and, therefore, confirmatory
testing is recommended for all previously diagnosed HIV positive
patients. Training was given to counsellors on helping individuals
deal with false positive results using common scenarios and role
playing. Specific information about the difference between HIV
cure and a false positive result was given in the pre-test counselling
to avoid misinterpretation. Psychological support was offered as
long as needed, and in some cases, free health care was continued
for a limited time for those found to be HIV negative.
Data analysis
The descriptive analysis was performed using univariate
analyses. Difference in means was evaluated using the Student’s
t-test.
Ethical considerations
This study met the standards set by the MSF Ethics Review
Board for retrospective analysis of routinely collected program-
matic data. As this represents routinely collected programmatic
data without personal identifiers, no individual patient consent was
obtained for this retrospective review.
Results
Setting
Democratic Republic of Congo. Bukavu is a city located in
eastern DRC, where MSF started an HIV programme in 2000.
The initial focus was on prevention in high risk groups, and in
2002 voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) was introduced
together with HIV care. Anti-retroviral treatment (ART) was
made available in 2003. Testing algorithms were changed over
time. Serial testing initially used Determine HIV-1/2 (Abbott
Laboratories) and Capillus HIV-1/HIV-2 (Trinity Biotech) in
parallel. By the end of 2004 this had evolved to Determine HIV-
1/2 and Uni-Gold HIV (Trinity Biotech) in parallel [12].
Counsellors tested venous samples in front of the client and if
found positive or discordant (only one test positive), a venous
sample was sent to the laboratory for repeat RDTs. HIV
prevalence in the testing centre was 19.3 percent (915 of 4738).
Burundi. Kinyinya is a rural setting in western Burundi
where MSF started a small HIV programme in 2005. Testing was
done in the laboratory on venous blood using a serial algorithm
with Determine HIV-1/2 and Genie II HIV-1/HIV-2 (Bio-Rad)
RDTs [12]. The test model was a combination of VCT and
provider initiated counselling and testing (PiTC). HIV prevalence
was five percent (123/2462).
Ethiopia. Abdurafi is a small farming community in north-
western Ethiopia, where MSF supports an HIV and kala azar
programme targeting migrant workers. VCT and PiCT were
performed using Determine HIV -1/2 and Uni-Gold HIV in
parallel on venous blood. In 2007, 2187 individuals were tested for
HIV with 304 (13.9%) positive.
Identification of individuals in HIV programmes for re-
testing
DRC. The first programme to re-test was in DRC where the
introduction of CD4 monitoring in 2004 led to a group of six
patients being identified as possibly having false positive HIV
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diagnoses on the basis of their relatively high CD4 counts and
high CD4/CD8 ratios. All six were re-tested with two RDTs and
found to be negative. A further group of 54 suspect patients was
identified for re-testing using screening criteria of CD4 .500 and
no disease progression over one year.
Burundi. Confirmation testing was introduced in 2007, and
retrospective testing of all previously identified positives was done
as the size of the cohort was small. Prior to re-testing, the
counsellors received training from an experienced counsellor on
how to support individuals receiving news of being falsely
diagnosed HIV positive.
Ethiopia. It was judged not feasible to re-test all the HIV
patients in the programme at the time confirmation testing was
introduced, so a high risk group was identified. Criteria were
CD4 .400, clinically stable or part of a discordant couple.
Re-testing results
DRC. In Bukavu, negative status was determined by repeat
double negative RDTs, often with the addition of ELISA. 38 out
of a total of 54 suspected false positives were found to be negative,
with the remaining cases either lost to follow-up or without
sufficient information on their charts to determine the final
outcome.
Burundi. 80 of 123 individuals registered in the HIV clinic
were traced and 78 agreed to re-test on RDTs with the OIC test.
Two (2.6%) patients were HIV negative on re-testing.
Ethiopia. 191 patients were identified and 149 (78.0%) re-
tested. Seven (4.7%) were found to be false positive on the basis of
RDTs, OIC and PCR.
Characteristics of misclassified individuals
DRC. Individuals identified were originally tested between
2002 and 2004. Median age was 43 years (IQR 27–46) and the
male to female ratio was 0.52. Out of a total of 38 falsely
diagnosed individuals, 51 percent were stage 1, 10 percent stage 2,
and 38 percent stage 3 at time of entry to the programme.
Amongst the 29 individuals with a recorded CD4 count, the
median value was 1107 (IQR 834–1404). One result was less than
500 with a value of 473. All had CD4:CD8 ratios over 1.0.
Burundi. The two individuals were initially tested in 2005
and 2006. Their ages were 52 and 26 years. One was tested when
she presented for medical care after sexual violence, the other
tested due to TB. Both were evaluated to be clinical stage 3. CD4
counts were not available in the programme.
Ethiopia. All seven individuals received their original test
results in 2007–8. Median age was 40 years (IQR 29.5–49.0). One
was female. Amongst the seven misclassified individuals, reasons
for original HIV testing were TB (one), kala azar (two), TB and
kala azar (one), fever of unknown origin (two), and desire to know
Figure 1. HIV Diagnostic Algorithm using the Orgenics Immunocomb CombfirmH confirmatory test.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059906.g001
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status (one). Six were in WHO clinical stage 3 or 4 and one in
stage 1. CD4 was recorded for four individuals; three had values
,500 (165, 350 and 490 respectively).
Consequences of misclassification
DRC. The interval between initial positive result and being
identified as negative was an average of 477 (range 17–771) days
for the 38 individuals falsely diagnosed. Two women and their
infants took ARV prophylaxis as part of the PMTCT programme;
none started ART.
Burundi. The interval between the initial false positive result
and being identified as negative was 577 and 828 days re-
spectively. Both individuals started ART. One on the basis of stage
3 clinical criteria (.10% weight loss), and the other on the basis of
pulmonary TB. Duration of ART was three and 18 months
respectively. One individual experienced severe ART side-effects
leading to a change in medications.
Ethiopia. The interval between initial positive result and
being identified as negative was an average of 460 (range 87–610)
days for the seven individuals falsely diagnosed. Four of the seven
were on ART at the time of the negative diagnosis with a mean
duration of 12.5 months (range 2–19 months).
Reaction to learning of their misclassification
DRC. The immediate reaction to the news that they had been
misdiagnosed as HIV positive was recorded by the counsellor in 21
of 38 cases (55.3%). 17 (80.9%) reactions were classified as happy,
three as unhappy, and one woman was not surprised as she was
already aware of her status. Amongst this group, the relief they felt
was tempered for some by concern that they would no longer
receive free health care. For others, being suddenly diagnosed as
HIV negative affected their relationship. One woman married to
an HIV positive man had been having unprotected sex for three
years. A leader in the peer support network had been divorced by
her HIV negative husband and re-married another HIV positive
man on being diagnosed HIV positive. Others were concerned
that everyone knew their status as HIV positive. Amongst the three
individuals who were initially unhappy to receive the news, one
woman was upset as she had stopped breastfeeding and in
addition, was now going to be excluded from the HIV support
group. Another was suspicious that the results were being used to
exclude her from the clinic. She was offered further counselling,
and on follow up, had accepted the news. One woman’s reaction
was mixed, as she felt overwhelmed at the disruption caused to her
life by the diagnosis and could not process the fact that she had
been falsely diagnosed. The individual, who was not surprised by
the results, had distrusted her initial result and had re-tested at
three different testing sites. All results were negative.
Burundi. Both patients were described as accepting the news
well. One of the individuals however expressed regret as his wife
had left him when she thought he was HIV positive.
Ethiopia. Immediate reactions to the test results were not
recorded systematically in Ethiopia. However all clients accepted
their results, though several had difficulty understanding how this
could have happened. Two individuals requested and received
a letter from MSF to help prove to others that they had been
falsely diagnosed.
Investigation of reasons for misclassification
DRC. Testing was done by trained nurse counsellors who
received weekly supervision from the laboratory supervisor.
However, it was identified that standard operating procedures
(SOPs) for performing the RDTs were not in use in the VCT, and
that at times the workload and stress on the counsellors was high.
Quality control was done on a monthly basis in 2002–2004;
however, results for the period in question were not available to
the investigators. Early in the programme there was a rupture of
one of the two RDTs. ELISA tests were substituted but
documentation of results was lacking. It could not be ruled out
that some individuals may have been diagnosed with a single test.
13 of the 38 identified were tested during this period.
Burundi. A review of testing practices did not reveal any
concern. High discordant rates were noted for 2006, with 280 out
of 1674 (16.7%) discordant using the serial algorithm of Determine
HIV-1/2 and Genie II HIV-1/HIV-2. Data was not available for
2005.
Ethiopia. The investigation in Ethiopia did not reveal any
concerns with testing procedures during the 14 months in 2007–8
when the false diagnoses took place. Data is available for
12 months of this period. 2337 tests were done, with 277 positive
(11.9%) and 118 discordant (5.0%). There was 100 percent
agreement for repeat testing on a randomly selected sample of 20
tests per month. The lab identified an error in VCT results in eight
out of 395 (2.0%) cases. These errors were immediately corrected
so did not result in patients being misclassified.
Impact on testing volumes
DRC. The identification of misclassified individuals in the
programme created immediate concern with the programme’s
team about the public credibility of the testing programme. A press
release describing the problem and the new quality control
measures was released in February 2005. The monthly average
number tested in the four months prior to the press release was
similar to that tested in the four months immediately following the
announcement (373 compared to 439 respectively, p = 0.35).
Burundi. Testing volumes for the four month period
immediately before and after introduction of re-testing, were 432
and 703 respectively.
Ethiopia. Mean monthly testing volumes for the four month
period immediately before and after the introduction of re-testing
were similar (243 and 230 respectively, p = 0.80).
Results of Confirmation testing
DRC. The false positive rate for the first five months of
confirmation testing using OIC for all double positive RDTs using
Determine HIV-1/2 and Uni-Gold HIV was 10.3 percent (34 of
330; 95% CI: 7.2%–14.1%) out of a total of 2864 tested.
Burundi. The proportion of double false positive RDTs on
prospective testing using a confirmatory algorithm was zero of 43
(0%, 95% CI 0%–8.2%) tested.
Ethiopia. In 2008, confirmation testing was introduced and
in the first 15 months 29 of 407 (7.1%, 95% CI 5.0%–10.1%) false
positives were prospectively identified.
Discussion
This analysis reveals that all three projects audited had
individuals enrolled in the HIV clinic who did not have HIV.
This suggests that HIV misdiagnosis is an issue likely affecting
a broad range of MSF programmes, but also has relevance for
programmes managed with less resources than those available to
MSF-supported programmes where the risks may be augmented.
We therefore urge all HIV testing programmes in these settings to
seriously consider this issue when designing and monitoring their
testing programmes.
It is hard to overestimate the impact on individuals and their
families of being diagnosed with HIV. Consequences are many
ranging from the emotional distress that accompanies the di-
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agnosis of a potentially fatal illness to the potential negative
reactions of family, community members and employers. We
encountered examples of individuals being divorced or thrown out
of their home on hearing of their (mis) diagnosis. Some pregnant
women stopped breast-feeding, putting the infants at an increased
mortality risk in these settings [13]. Individuals in our cohorts were
needlessly exposed to medications associated with toxicity in the
short-term, but also with unknown long-term effects in non-HIV
infected people. Eligibility criteria for ART in resource-limited
settings include many clinical conditions and CD4 levels that are
not specific to HIV [14]. The recent trend toward earlier initiation
of ART both for treatment and to prevent transmission of HIV
[15] will increase the risk of initiating ART in patients who do not
have HIV. Many clinicians are not aware that low CD4 counts
can occur in conditions other than HIV. There are two main
scenarios for this. One is in the case of acute severe illness; Feeney
and colleagues report CD4 levels in 102 patients admitted to the
intensive care unit, only three of whom were HIV positive. 41
percent had CD4 levels below 400, and 29 percent were below
300. The CD4/CD8 ratio, thought to be a marker of HIV
infection, was less than one in 16 percent [16]. Secondly,
individuals have been identified with low levels of CD4 without
HIV infection, both associated with opportunistic infections and
also when asymptomatic [17–19].
The average time spent with a false diagnosis for the 47
individuals described here was 484 days, with a range up to
1287 days. On a programmatic level, the erroneous inclusion of
these individuals represents significant wasted resources. While
a cost effectiveness analysis is outside the scope of this paper, these
results suggest that the decision to exclude a confirmation test in
the testing algorithm may be a false economy.
The reason why individuals were falsely classified as HIV
positive is multi-factorial. MSF testing programmes devote
significant resources to supervision and quality control. Investiga-
tion in two of the three programmes did not reveal concerns in this
area. In DRC, where some issues were identified, the problem
persisted after resolving the quality issues. The testing algorithms
did not include the higher risk tie-breaker, and used RDTs
commonly in use in the country. The high percentage of false
positives identified on the MSF confirmatory algorithm in
Ethiopia and DRC suggests poor performance of the RDT
diagnostic algorithm as the main cause of the false positives. In
Burundi, no false positives were identified in prospective testing
however the numbers were small and the high discordancy rate
suggests that cross reactivity was occurring. The variability in false
positive rates shown in our three programmes may also result from
our experience that rates of cross-reactivity vary between
programmes and over time within programmes (data not shown).
The risk of false positives due to poor specificity of the screening
test is higher in low prevalence areas. None of the three testing
centres profiled here can be considered as low prevalence and yet
problems with poor positive predictive values are illustrated in the
results of the confirmatory algorithm for two centres. While there
is no doubt that higher prevalence contexts will have less risk of
false positives, these examples illustrate that the risk is present even
in higher prevalence settings.
A postulated reason for false positives is that individuals may
have falsely presented to programmes as HIV positive for
secondary gain such as free health care or access to nutritional
support. While this may be a cause of false positives in some
programmes, it did not play a factor in these three programmes as
standard practice was to re-test all those tested outside of MSF
centres.
Confirmation testing was introduced to all MSF testing centres
without significant disruption to services and with minimal cost.
Similarly it proved possible to re-test patients enrolled in HIV
clinics without negatively impacting on the testing uptake. A
reason postulated to not re-test individuals in HIV programmes to
confirm their diagnosis, is that it would undermine faith in the
testing programme. This reasoning prioritizes the potential risk to
the majority who are correctly identified as HIV positive over the
harm done to the small minority falsely diagnosed. MSF’s
experience is that this trade-off is not necessary. In fact, in many
communities, the problems with testing were well known as
individuals often re-test on their own or visit other centres to
‘confirm’ their diagnosis. Communication that a new more
accurate algorithm is available has actually improved people’s
faith in the testing programme in our experience and consequently
uptake of testing has not been adversely affected, as illustrated in
the three case studies. Another concern expressed was that of legal
repercussions, however, MSF has experienced none despite having
offered re-testing in more than 10 programmes.
This analysis has a number of limitations. The programmes
used to illustrate the intervention were not chosen randomly and
therefore may not accurately reflect the range of programmes.
Efforts were made to choose programmes representative of MSF’s
projects at the time, and to include a small and a large
programme, as well as an integrated programme (Burundi) and
a vertical project (Ethiopia, DRC). The data were collected as part
of routine programmatic activities and therefore the consistency of
collection across programmes cannot be assured. There are also
areas of missing data in some programmes.
Conclusions
The false diagnosis of HIV is an under-recognized but
important risk in HIV programmes in resource-limited settings
with significant impacts on affected individuals. Causes are
multifactorial but applicable to all programmes in these settings.
We were able to improve our testing and counselling services to
reduce the risk to patients and feasibly introduce repeat and
confirmation testing into established programmes without under-
mining confidence in the testing. Considering the importance of
the HIV diagnosis to the individual, as well as the resources
needed to care for someone with HIV, programmes should
consider investigating current cohorts to determine if some
individuals are misclassified. In addition, urgent attention is
needed to improving quality control procedures at testing centres,
and to further pilot confirmatory algorithms that are low cost and
feasible to implement in resource limited settings.
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